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Abstract. Cloud computing is emerging as a revolutionary computing paradigm 
which provides a flexible and economic strategy for data management and re-
source sharing. Security and privacy become major concerns in the cloud sce-
nario, for which Searchable Encryption (SE) technology is proposed to support 
efficient retrieval of encrypted data. However, the absence of lightweight ranked 
search is still a typical shortage in existing SE schemes. In this paper, we propose 
a Lightweight Efficient Multi-keyword Ranked Search over Encrypted Cloud 
Data using Dual Word Embeddings (LRSE) scheme that supports top-k retrieval 
in the known background model. For the first time, we formulate the privacy 
issue and design goals for lightweight ranked search in SE. We employ word 
embedding trained on the whole English Wikipedia using word2vec to replace 
the general dictionary, afterwards we make use of Dual Embedding Space Model 
(DESM) to substitute traditional Vector Space Model (VSM), based on which we 
achieve the goal of lightweight ranked search with higher precision and solve the 
challenging problems caused by updating the traditional dictionary in existing SE 
schemes. In LRSE, we employ an improved secure kNN scheme to guarantee 
sufficient privacy protection. Our security analysis shows that LRSE satisfies our 
formulated privacy requirements and extensive experiments performed on real-
world datasets demonstrate that LRSE indeed accords with our proposed design 
goals. 
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1 Introduction 
Cloud computing is a revolutionary computing paradigm which provides a flexible and 
economic strategy for data management and resource sharing [1], [2], thus is getting 
more and more attention from both academic and industry communities. However, se-
curity and privacy become major concerns in the cloud scenario when data owners out-
source their private data onto public cloud servers to be accessed by the authenticated 
users. Usually, the cloud server is considered as curious and untrusted entities [3], thus 
there are risks of data exposure to a third party or even the cloud service provider itself. 
Therefore, providing sufficient security and privacy protections on sensitive data is ex-
tremely important, especially for those applications dealing with health, financial and 
government data. To avoid information leakage, the sensitive data has to be encrypted 
before uploading onto the cloud servers, which makes it a big challenge to support ef-
ficient keyword-based queries and rank the matching results on the encrypted data. 
In the branch of plaintext information retrieval (IR) and document filtering, such as 
a common practice in web search engines (e.g., Google search), data users may tend to 
provide a set of keywords as the indicator of their search interest to retrieve the most 
relevant data. “Coordinate matching”, i.e., as many matches as possible, and ranking 
matching documents by certain criteria, has been widely used in the plaintext infor-
mation retrieval (IR) field. In the field of document retrieval and natural language pro-
cessing, deep learning-based methods, such as word embeddings [4], are emerging as 
replacing traditional term vectors for measuring relatedness between terms. However, 
existing techniques in plaintext information retrieval and document filtering cannot be 
used in SE scenario directly. How to apply existing schemes in the plaintext field to 
encrypted cloud data search systems remains a challenging task. 
To address the issue, searchable encryption (SE) technology has been proposed in 
the literature in pursuit of search over encrypted data. For schemes [3,5] that realize 
flexible search, they only support Boolean keyword search or single keyword search 
and return inaccurate results that are often loosely related to the user’s intent. In 2014, 
Cao et al. [6] firstly proposed an effective mechanism called MRSE to partially solve 
the multi-keyword ranked search problem according to the number of matching key-
words between the query and documents, which established the foundation and basic 
framework of multi-keyword ranked search in the field of searchable encryption. As far 
as we know, most of latest schemes in SE follow this framework, such as [7, 8, 9]. As 
a consequence, they have the same congenital drawbacks. Here we conclude the con-
genital drawbacks of existing searchable encryption schemes as follows: 
1) Low precision. Most of latest existing SE schemes which follow the classic 
MRSE scheme [6] are based on keyword match-based method, which is functionally 
inferior in the view of current plaintext information retrieval and machine learning. 
For example, MRSE simply counts the number of matching keywords between 
query and documents and does not take the access frequencies of the keywords into 
account. Although following work such as [6, 8, 9] emploies tf-idf weight to substi-
tute occurrence bits in binary vectors, they are still too primal and basic schemes, 
because tf-idf weighting is quite a classic technique in information retrieval field. 
Besides, in MRSE_II, in order to guarantee security and avoid Scale Analysis Attack 
[6], the authors insert U dummy keywords in subindex Ii., which makes the final 
score deviate from the real score. For example, we can set U = 200, and the dimen-
sion of the keyword dictionary becomes 4000. In the framework, they cannot resolve 
difficulties in achieving both high precision and security, i.e., if they set the standard 
deviation σ of the random variable ε larger, the final results are totally irrelevant to 
the query because of the U inserted dummy keywords.  Or, if they set σ lower, this 
framework cannot withstand the Scale Analysis Attack [6]. In conclusion, these two 
reasons cause the problem of low precision. 
2) Dimension disaster. In MRSE [6], the system overhead during the whole pro-
cess of index construction, trapdoor generation, and executing query, is mostly de-
termined by matrix multiplication, in another word, the large dimension of the sparse 
vector according to the dictionary in this framework causes dimension disaster. For 
example, in MRSE_II time cost of building index for a data owner is almost 6,700s, 
when the number of documents in the dataset is 10,000 and the dictionary has 4,000 
keywords, which is too time consuming. This problem leads to a result that search-
able encryption schemes cannot be practically put into use in a real-world scenario.   
3) Problems caused by dictionary updates. Because all the dimensions of secret 
key SK, index and trapdoor are determined by the dictionary, an update in the dic-
tionary will lead to a result that all generated index and trapdoor cannot be used and 
all previous work should be executed again. 
4) Lack of fuzzy search and intelligent search. For example, if data user inputs 
“Java.” in the query, if the corresponding keyword in the dictionary is “java”, there 
is no possibility to return relevant results due to the lack of “Java.” in the dictionary 
and keyword match-based method. Let alone some more advanced examples in ex-
isting plaintext information retrieval, such as intelligent search using the semantic 
similarity, for example, “java” and “python”, or “iPhone” and “cellphone”. Because 
keyword match-based method cannot measure semantic similarities in such cases. 
 
In conclusion, further researches are necessary to achieve lightweight efficient multi-
keyword ranked search over encrypted cloud data with privacy preserved and higher 
precision. In this paper, we discuss a deep learning-based approach which supports 
fuzzy search and intelligent search, and consider useful techniques for updating dic-
tionaries, which is still a challenging problem. 
In this paper, we propose a Lightweight Efficient Multi-keyword Ranked Search 
over Encrypted Cloud Data using Dual Word Embeddings (LRSE) scheme that sup-
ports top-k retrieval in the known background model. In summary, this paper makes 
the following contributions: 
1) It firstly establishes a set of design goals and privacy issues for lightweight 
multi-keyword ranked search in a known background model. The improved kNN 
scheme guarantees high privacy protection. 
2) For the first time, it introduces deep learning-based method in SE framework. 
It combines word embedding trained using word2vec and dual embedding space 
model (DESM), to achieve the goal of lightweight efficient multi-keyword ranked 
search over encrypted cloud data, providing search results with higher precision and 
more consistent with the query. Besides, it can also support fuzzy and intelligent 
search. 
3) It lightens the problems caused by dictionary updates and reduces the system 
cost even when the vocabulary in our scheme has to be updated, through dimension 
reduction by utilizing word embeddings.   
4) Thorough analysis investigating privacy and performance evaluation is given, 
and experiments on the real-world dataset further show the proposed scheme indeed 
introduces low overhead. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: we discuss existing related work 
on searchable encryption and document filtering based on deep learning in Section 2. 
In Section 3, we introduce the system model, security requirements, design goals, and 
preliminary on word embeddings. Section 4 describes the LRSE framework and pro-
posed schemes, followed by Section 5, which focuses on security analysis. Section 6 
presents performance evaluation and simulation results. At last we conclude the paper 
in Section 7. 
2 Related Work 
2.1 Existing Searchable Encryption 
Cao et al. [6] propose an effective mechanism which can partially solve the multi-
keyword ranked query problem according to the number of matching keywords, how-
ever, MRSE does not take the access frequencies of the keywords into account. It only 
returns the documents ordered by the number of matched keywords. Besides, MRSE 
has problems such as dimension disaster and low precision. Yu et al. [11] propose a 
two-round searchable encryption that supports top-k multi-keyword retrieval, which 
can guarantee high security and practical efficiency. But it is also based on keyword-
match based method, and has the problems of low precision and lack of intelligent 
search. 
2.2 Document Filtering based on Deep Learning 
Nalisnick et al. [10] propose a dual embedding space model, which can be used to 
calculate the similarity for a document and a query term, complementing the traditional 
term frequency based approach. However, it is not directly applicable in the context of 
encrypted cloud data retrieval. 
3 Problem Formulation 
3.1 System Model 
As illustrated in Fig. 1, our scheme involves three different entities. 
 Fig. 1. System Model 
1. The cloud server: The cloud server is an intermediate entity hosting third-party data 
storage and retrieve services to authenticated data users. When received a trapdoor 
from the data user, the cloud server will locate the matching files by scanning the 
indexes I, calculate corresponding relevance scores, and return the ranked top-k re-
sults to the data user. 
2. The data owner: The data owner encrypts a collection of files using symmetric en-
cryption algorithm and builds a searchable index I, then he outsources both the en-
crypted indexes I and encrypted files C onto the cloud server. After that, the data 
owner sends the symmetric key and secret key SK to the data user. 
3. The data user: The data user generates a trapdoor with SK and sends it to the cloud 
server. Afterward, the data user is returned the most relevant top-k encrypted files 
and indexes, he decrypts and makes use of them with the help of the symmetric key 
and SK. 
Note here, there is a special case where the data owner is the same as the data user, 
that’s to say, the data owner keeps his secret key SK by himself and only searches over 
his own encrypted documents. Then there are only two entities left in this special case: 
the data owner and the cloud server. This case also has many vivid applications in daily 
life, for example, when we upload our local documents in the phone and PC to the cloud 
server, such as: Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and Baidu cloud drive, there is a horrible 
security problem: all of our passwords, patents to be published, private photos, health 
records are exposed to the mentioned companies. Then this special case could help 
solve this problem. 
3.2 Security Requirements 
The cloud server is considered as honest but curious, i.e., it is designed to execute the 
service algorithm faithfully, however, it is also curious and eager to attain sensitive 
information. We define the security requirements as follows: 
1. Data, index, and trapdoor privacy: Data privacy means that LRSE should prevent 
the cloud server from poking its nose into the outsourced data. Index privacy means 
that the index should be constructed to prevent the cloud server from performing 
association attack i.e., deducing any association between keywords and encrypted 
documents. Besides, trapdoor privacy means what the user submits according to his 
interest is well protected by the complexity of trapdoor generating algorithm. 
2. Unlinkability of trapdoors: In LRSE, we define the unlinkability of trapdoors in a 
harsh model, Known Background Model [6]. In this case, the cloud server is more 
powerful and possesses some statistical information to carry out Scale Analysis At-
tack [6]. We should assure that the cloud server would not be able to identify the 
keywords in a query even if some background information had been leaked. 
3.3 Design Goals 
In order to realize our LRSE scheme, the following security and performance guaran-
tees should be simultaneously achieved: 
1. Lightweight efficient multi-keyword ranked search: It can support efficient 
multi-keyword based query with low overheads and higher precision, guarantee the 
most relevant files to appear in the top-k locations, and solve the dimension disaster. 
2. Privacy-preserving: To meet all of the harsh security requirements specified in Sec-
tion 3.2. 
3. Solving the problem caused by dictionary updates: As specified in Section 1, tra-
ditional MRSE-based schemes utilize a dictionary containing around 10,000 key-
words, but which is far from enough. Once the dictionary is updated, all generated 
indices and trapdoors cannot be used and the whole process should be executed 
again. We should solve this problem. 
4. Fuzzy and intelligent search supporting: Supporting fuzzy and intelligent search 
in searchable encryption is necessary. It can realize various functions in SE as intel-
ligent as today’s web search engines (e.g., Google search) and output the data files 
consistent with the user’s interest. 
3.4 Preliminary on Word Embeddings 
Word embeddings [4] are a generic name of a set of NLP techniques, where each unique 
word is represented by a relatively low dimension vector of real numbers. Their models 
are learned through two-layer neural networks, to capture linguistic contexts of words. 
We trained word embeddings using word2vec [4] in this paper. Word2vec helps to rep-
resent each word w of the training set as a vector of features, where this vector is sup-
posed to capture the contexts in which w appears.  
In this paper, we chose the whole English Wikipedia corpus, containing 2,126,359 
words, as the training set. Our training parameters of word2vec are set as follows: con-
tinuous bag of words (CBOW) model instead of the skip-gram (word2vec options: 
cbow = 1); the output vectors size is set to 100 (word2vec options: size = 100); the 
number of negative samples is set to 25 (word2vec options: negative = 25). 
4 The Design of LRSE 
In this section, we first propose a basic idea for the LRSE by elegantly combining word 
embedding and dual embedding space model (DESM) with an improved kNN scheme, 
which mainly consists of the following four phases: GenKey, BuildIndex, Gen-
Trapdoor, and Query. 
4.1 GenKey 
The data owner randomly generates a (n+2)-dimension binary vector as S and two 
(n+2)×(n+2) invertible matrices {M1, M2}, where n equals to the dimension of word 
embeddings we obtained in Section 3.4. We extend the dimension of vectors in our 
schemes to (n+2)-dimension in order to introduce random numbers in the final results 
to protect the search results. The secret key SK is in the form of a 3-tuple as {S, M1, 
M2}. 
Note here, S is part of secret key SK, which is exactly a binary vector, acting as an 
indicating vector in the spilt process of building index and generating trapdoor. S is 
randomly generated by the data owner using existing Random Number Generation Al-
gorithm (PRGA) in the field of information security, which is not within the scope of 
this paper. 
4.2 BuildIndex 
The data owner utilizes the tf-idf statistical method to extract keywords, usually top-
25 keywords for each document in our scheme. Di is the keyword set of i-th document. 
|𝐷𝑖| denotes the number of keywords in the i-th document. dij is the embedding vector 
for the j-th keyword of the i-th document. Let 𝐷𝑖̅̅ ̅ denotes the centroid of all the nor-
malized document word vectors serving as a single embedding for document Di. So we 
define vector 𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗ using the following equation:  
𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗ =
𝐷?̇?̅̅ ̅
‖𝐷ⅈ̅̅ ̅‖
         (1) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 
𝐷𝑖̇̅̅ ̅ =
1
|𝐷ⅈ|
∑
ⅆ𝑖𝑗
‖𝑑𝑖𝑗‖
𝑑𝑖𝑗∈𝐷𝑖
     (2) 
Then we extend the dimension of 𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗ from n to n+2, which means adding a random 
number 𝜀ⅈ  in the (n+1)-dimension and 1 in the (n+2)-th dimension. 𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗ is therefore ex-
tended to (𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗, 𝜀ⅈ, 1). 𝜀ⅈ obeys the normal distribution, whose standard deviation is 𝜎, 
actually 𝜀ⅈ is used to obscure the query results to resist frequency analysis attack and 
its range is determined by the range of query results. 
 
Every plaintext subindex 𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗ is then spilt into a data vector pair donated as {𝐷𝑖′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗, 𝐷𝑖′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  } 
using the splitting process of the secure k-nearest neighbor (kNN) scheme [12] as fol-
lows: For m=1 to n+2, if 𝑆 [𝑚] = 1, then 𝐷?̇?′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗[𝑚] and 𝐷?̇?′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  [𝑚] are set to two random 
numbers so that their sum is equal to 𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗[𝑚]; else, 𝐷?̇?′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗[𝑚] and 𝐷?̇?′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  [𝑚] are set as the 
same as 𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗[𝑚]. Finally, the subindex 𝐼ⅈ = {𝑀1
𝑇𝐷𝑖′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗, 𝑀2
𝑇𝐷𝑖′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  } is built for every encrypted 
document Ci. 
4.3 GenTrapdoor 
The data user inputs a set of query keywords according to his interest. We define Q 
is the keyword set of query, thus |𝑄| is the number of the keywords in the query. 
Vector 𝑞𝑘  is the embedding vector for the k-th keyword of the query. Thus ?⃗?  is 
generated as follows: 
?⃗? =
1
|𝑄|
∑
𝑞𝑘
‖𝑞𝑘‖𝑞𝑘∈𝑄
    (3) 
The vector ?⃗?  is extended to (n+1)-dimension, where the (n+1)-dimension is set to 
1, then multiplied by a random number 𝑟 ≠ 0, and finally extended to a (n+2)-dimen-
sion vector where the last dimension is set to another random number t. ?⃗?  is therefore 
equal to (𝑟?⃗? , 𝑟, 𝑡). Here only the data user knows the exact values of r and t. 
For m=1 to (n+2), if 𝑆 [𝑚] = 0, then 𝑄′⃗⃗⃗⃗ [𝑚] and 𝑄′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗[𝑚] are set to two random num-
bers so that their sum is equal to ?⃗? [𝑚]; else, 𝑄′⃗⃗⃗⃗ [𝑚] and 𝑄′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗[𝑚] are set the same as 
?⃗? [𝑚]. Finally, the trapdoor T is generated as {𝑀1
−1𝑄′⃗⃗⃗⃗ , 𝑀2
−1𝑄′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗} for the query. 
 
4.4 Query 
For each document Di, with the trapdoor T, the cloud server computes the similarity 
scores as shown in the following equation, ranks all scores and returns the top-k ranked 
files and their corresponding indexes to the data user. 
Note that we are not simply replacing the dictionary using word embedding. Because 
vectors generated from word embeddings cannot be used in the secure kNN framework 
directly. We utilize the dual embedding space model (DESM) model [10] to replace the 
VSM model in MRSE-based schemes. Finally we modified the original scheme and 
achieve our goal of combining DESM model and the secure kNN framewok using 
Equ.(4-5). 
                                           𝐼ⅈ ⋅ 𝑇 = {𝑀1
𝑇𝐷𝑖′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗, 𝑀2
𝑇𝐷𝑖′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  } ∙{𝑀1
−1𝑄′⃗⃗⃗⃗ , 𝑀2
−1𝑄′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗} 
                                                    =  𝐷𝑖′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ ∙ 𝑄′⃗⃗⃗⃗  + 𝐷𝑖′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ∙ 𝑄′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗  =   𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗ ∙ ?⃗?  
 = (𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗, 𝜀ⅈ, 1) ∙ (𝑟?⃗? , 𝑟, 𝑡) 
      = r{DESM(Di,Q) + 𝜀ⅈ} + t  (4) 
where, 
 DESM(Di,Q) = 
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‖𝐷ⅈ̅̅ ̅‖
∙ 
1
|𝑄|
∑
𝑞𝑘
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   (5) 
5 Security Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the security properties under the schemes we introduced 
above. We will focus on three aspects: data privacy, index and trapdoor privacy, and 
trapdoor unlinkability. 
5.1 Data Privacy 
Traditional symmetric key encryption techniques (e.g., AES [12]) could be properly 
utilized here to guarantee data privacy and is not within the scope of this paper. 
5.2 Index and Trapdoor Privacy 
According to the secure kNN scheme [13], if the secret key SK is kept confidential, the 
index privacy is well protected by the computation complexity of deducing the meaning 
of every item in the index. In addition, the introduction of random number 𝜀ⅈ in Build-
Index procedure also adds to the complexity and nondeterminicity of the index gener-
ation. As a result, even the generated indexes for the same search document Fi by the 
same data owner  at different index building times are always irrelevant because of the 
randomness in the spilt process [13] and the nondeterminicity of random number 𝜀ⅈ. 
  Based on the same principle, the produced trapdoors will be irrelevant even to the 
same query at different trapdoor generating times. Besides, the introduction of random 
numbers r and t also contributes to the trapdoor privacy. Note here, random numbers r 
and t is not only used to enhance the trapdoor privacy, but also to make the final query 
results different even for the same query at different query times. 
5.3 Trapdoor Unlinkability 
The trapdoor should be constructed to prevent the cloud server from deducing the re-
lationships of any given trapdoors and the corresponding keywords, for example, Scale 
Analysis Attack in a Known Background Model introduced in [6]. Basically, Scale 
Analysis Attack in MRSE schemes is based on sparse binary vectors, which cannot be 
applied to our scheme because all the initial vectors in our schemes are low-dimen-
sional vectors of real numbers generated from our word embeddings. Thus we can 
draw a conclusion that we achieve the same security level of trapdoor unlinkability as 
MRSE_II scheme [10] from the point of resisting Scale Analysis Attack. Besides, even 
under the extreme condition that the cloud server decrypts the vector, it still needs 
as many as (𝐶𝑁
1+𝐶𝑁
2+𝐶𝑁
3 + ⋯+ 𝐶𝑁
𝑘)/2 computation of Equ.3 in average to confirm 
the keywords concealed behind the word embedding vector, where k ranges from 5 to 
50, and N = 212,6359. In another word, word embeddings introduced in LRSE help 
enhance trapdoor unlinkability. 
We note, however, that, we cannot protect against Access Pattern [6], which is defined 
as the sequence of ranked search results. Although our proposed scheme is not designed 
to protect against Access Pattern, because of the efficiency consideration just as most 
existing SE schemes (excluding costly PIR technique [7]).  To deal with the situation, 
we add the random number 𝜀ⅈ in the final result. The precision of our scheme is affected 
by the standard deviation 𝜎 of the random number 𝜀ⅈ.  
From the consideration of precision, 𝜎 is expected be smaller to obtain high preci-
sion. For example, in an extreme case, 𝜎 is set to 0, then all the final ranked results are 
absolutely the same as the true ranked query results, while Access Pattern are totally 
without protection. Thus the standard deviation 𝜎 can act as a flexible trade-off param-
eter to adjust precision and security of Access Pattern. 
6 Performance Evaluation 
6.1 Functionality 
As illustrated in [10], DESM model performs better than traditional keyword match-
based methods, for example, BM25 [10]. While the MRSE schemes are actually based 
on simply counting the matched keywords number among the index and trapdoor, 
which is an quite original keyword match-based method. Let alone MRSE_II scheme 
adds U dummy keywords to the final results, for example, U = 200. We can draw a 
conclusion that our precision is much larger than MRSE-based schemes. Besides, as 
presented in Section 5.3: the precision can be affected by the standard deviation σ of 
the random variable εi. It is obvious that a smaller σ leads to better precision. If we do 
not attempt to protect Access Pattern at all, σ could be set as 0, and it will not affect the 
true ranked query results. 
Our scheme can also support fuzzy search and intelligent search, for example, if we 
search “Java.”, the top-k keywords are as follows: “Java”, “swing”, “android”, “c++”, 
“c#”, “python”, “eclipse”, etc. And if we input “android” as a query keyword, the top-
k relevant keywords are: “Android”, ”iPhone”, ”blackberry”, ”emulator”, “java”, etc.  
LRSE also lightens the problems caused by dictionary updates: since the vocabulary 
size of our word embeddings is large enough, we almost do not need to change the 
vocabulary. Besides, LRSE can also reduces the system cost even when the vocabulary 
in our scheme has to be updated, through dimension reduction by utilizing word em-
beddings. 
6.2 Efficiency 
We conduct a thorough experiment on a real-world dataset: the NSF research award 
dataset1 and evaluate the performance of LRSE compared with the MRSE schemes [6]. 
1. Building Index: The time cost of building the whole index is related to the number 
of documents and the computation complex of building each subindex. As presented 
in Section 4.2, the major computation of building a subindex includes four parts: 
search in word embeddings for each keyword of the document, generate the initial 
vector using Equ.1, the splitting process and two multiplications of an (n + 2) × (n 
+ 2) matrix and an (n + 2)-dimension vector. As illustrated in Tab.1, given the same 
size of dataset with 1000 documents, the index construction time of LRSE is much 
less than MRSE schemes due to the difference of their vector dimensions, for exam-
ple, when the dimension of vectors in LRSE and MRSE are 100 and 4,000 respec-
tively, LRSE is much more lightweight. Tab.2 shows the time cost of building index 
with different document number when the vector dimension in LRSE is 300, while 
the keyword number in the dictionary is 4000 in MRSE, we can see the time cost of 
LRSE scheme is much less. The time cost of building the whole index is almost 
linear with the size of dataset since the time cost of building each subindex is fixed. 
Besides, as shown in Tab.3, we compare the storage overhead of subindex in LRSE, 
MRSE_I, and MRSE_II within different sizes of dictionary. The size of subindex is 
absolutely linear with the size of dictionary. 
Table 1. Time cost of building index with different vector dimension 
Dim_MRSE 2000 4000 6000 8000 
MRSE_I (s) 83.676 582.053 1874.998 4319.606 
MRSE_II (s) 106.489 671.911 1979.112 4608.017 
Dim_LRSE 50 100 200 300 
LRSE (s) 5.938 6.536 9.577 13.612 
Table 2. Time cost of building index with different document number 
Doc_num 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 
MRSE_I (s) 1117.463 2240.320 3404.328 4633.588 5856.057 
MRSE_II (s) 1348.232 2679.574 4026.798 5460.893 6802.423 
LRSE (s) 27.124 54.787 81.986 110.642 136.600 
Table 3. Size of subindex/trapdoor 
Dim_MRSE 4000 6000 8000 10000 
MRSE_I (KB) 31.2656 46.8906 62.5156 78.1406 
                                                          
1  https://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/nsfabs/nsfawards.html 
MRSE_II (KB) 32.8203 48.4453 64.0703 79.6953 
Dim_LRSE 50 100 200 300 
LRSE (KB) 0.4063 0.76969 1.5781 2.3594 
 
2. Generating Trapdoor: Time cost of generating each trapdoor is determined by four 
parts: search over word embeddings for each keyword in query using HashMap, 
generate the initial vector using Equ.3, the complexity of the splitting process and 
multiplications of a matrix and two spilt query vector. As shown in Tab.4, the time 
of generating a trapdoor is greatly affected by the dimension of vectors. Thus the 
trapdoor generating time of LRSE is much less than MRSE schemes due to the dif-
ference of their dimensions. Besides, as illustrated in Tab.5, the number of keywords 
in the query has little influence upon the result because the dimension of vector and 
matrices is always fixed with the same word embeddings, here the vector dimension 
in LRSE is set to 100, while the keyword number in the dictionary of MRSE is set 
to 4,000. With respect to the size of the trapdoor, it occupies the same space overhead 
as that of each subindex listed in Tab. 3, which is only determined by the dimension 
of the word embeddings. 
3. Executing Query: The major computation to execute a query in the cloud server 
consists of computing the similarity scores of each index and trapdoor, and ranking 
similarity scores for all documents in the dataset and selecting top-k results from all 
the scored documents. Thus the executing query time of LRSE is much less than 
MRSE schemes due to the difference of their dimensions, as shown in Tab.6. we set 
k to 50 in our experiment. We can learn that the query time is linear with both the 
number of documents in the dataset and the size of the dictionary. In addition, our 
proposed scheme introduces nearly constant overhead as increasing the number of 
query keywords for the same reason as described in generating trapdoor.  
Table 4. Time cost of generating trapdoor with different vector dimension 
Dim_MRSE 2000 4000 6000 8000 
MRSE_I (s) 0.185 0.710 1.633 2.899 
MRSE_II (s) 0.213 0.767 1.716 2.974 
Dim_LRSE 50 100 200 300 
LRSE (s) 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.006 
Table 5. Time cost of generating trapdoor with different keyword number in query 
Keyword num 10 25 40 50 
MRSE_I (s) 0.715 0.710 0.701 0.717 
MRSE_II (s) 0.772 0.767 0.761 0.761 
LRSE (s) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
Table 6. Time cost of query with 1000 documents 
Dim_MRSE 2000 4000 6000 8000 
MRSE_I (s) 0.008230 0.015790 0.023460 0.032200 
MRSE_II (s) 0.008525 0.016324 0.026690 0.034324 
Dim_LRSE 50 100 200 300 
LRSE (s) 0.000370 0.000550 0.000980 0.001480 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a Lightweight Efficient Multi-keyword Ranked Search over 
Encrypted Cloud Data using Dual Word Embeddings (LRSE) scheme, which supports 
top-k retrieval in the known background model. We first formulate stringent privacy 
requirements and design goals in LRSE. For the first time, we introduce deep learning-
based method in SE framework. We combine word embeddings trained using word2vec 
and dual embedding space model (DESM), which provides search results with higher 
precision and more consistent with the query. Besides, we show examples that our 
scheme can also support fuzzy and intelligent search. Security analysis shows that the 
proposed scheme accords with our formulated privacy requirements. Extensive exper-
iments based on real-word dataset demonstrate that the proposed scheme achieves the 
design goals. In the future, we will introduce personalized search and multi-grained 
security into our scheme. We will also conduct experiments on the famous Cranfield2 
collection to further verify our precision in the future. 
8 References 
1. H. Li, Y. Dai, L. Tian, and H. Yang, “Identity-based authentication for cloud computing,” 
in Proceedings of Cloud computing. Springer, 2009, pp. 157–166. 
2. H. Liang, L. X. Cai, D. Huang, X. Shen, and D. Peng, “An smdpbased service model for 
interdomain resource allocation in mobile cloud networks,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular 
Technology, vol. 61, no. 5, pp. 2222–2232, 2012. 
3. C. Wang, N. Cao, J. Li, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Secure ranked keyword search over encrypted 
cloud data,” in the 30th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems 
(ICDCS). IEEE, 2010, pp. 253–262.  
4. Mikolov, Tomas, et al. "Distributed representations of words and phrases and their compo-
sitionality." Advances in neural information processing systems. 2013. 
                                                          
2  http://ir.dcs.gla.ac.uk/resources/test_collections/cran/ 
5. J. Li, Q. Wang, C. Wang, N. Cao, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Fuzzy keyword search over en-
crypted data in cloud computing,” in Proceedings of INFOCOM. IEEE, 2010, pp. 1–5. 
6. N. Cao, C. Wang, M. Li, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Privacy-preserving multikeyword ranked 
search over encrypted cloud data,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 
vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 222–233, 2014. 
7. Ishai Y, Kushilevitz E, Ostrovsky R, et al. Cryptography from Anonymity.[J]. Foundations 
of Computer Science Annual Symposium on, 2006, 2006:239-248. 
8. Shen Z, Shu J, Xue W. Preferred keyword search over encrypted data in cloud compu-
ting[C]// Ieee/acm, International Symposium on Quality of Service. ACM, 2013:1-6. 
9. Zhao R, Li H, Yang Y, et al. Privacy-preserving personalized search over encrypted cloud 
data supporting multi-keyword ranking[C]// Sixth International Conference on Wireless 
Communications and Signal Processing. IEEE, 2014:1-6. 
10. Nalisnick, Eric, et al. "Improving document ranking with dual word embeddings."Proceed-
ings of the 25th International Conference Companion on World Wide Web. International 
World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee, 2016. 
11. J. Yu, P. Lu, Y. Zhu, G. Xue, and M. Li, “Towards secure multikeyword top-k retrieval over 
encrypted cloud data,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 10, 
no. 4, pp. 239–250, 2013. 
12. N. Ferguson, R. Schroeppel, and D. Whiting, “A simple algebraic representation of 
rijndael,” in Selected Areas in Cryptography. Springer, 2001, pp. 103–111. 
13. W. K. Wong, D. W.-l. Cheung, B. Kao, and N. Mamoulis, “Secure knn computation on 
encrypted databases,” in the 2009 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management 
of data. ACM, 2009, pp. 139–152. 
